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In this paper we present an analytically tractable overlapping generations model of human capital accumulation,
and study its implications for the evolution of the U.S. wage distribution from 1970 to 2000. The key
feature of the model, and the only source of heterogeneity, is that individuals differ in their ability
to accumulate human capital. Therefore, wage inequality results only from differences in human capital
accumulation. We examine the response of this model to skill-biased technical change (SBTC) theoretically.
We show that in response to SBTC, the model generates behavior consistent with several features
of the U.S. data including (i) a rise in overall wage inequality both in the short run and long run, (ii)
an initial fall in the education premium followed by a strong recovery, leading to a higher premium
in the long run, (iii) the fact that most of this fall and rise takes place among younger workers, (iv)
a rise in within-group inequality, (v) stagnation in median wage growth (and a slowdown in aggregate
labor productivity), and (vi) a rise in consumption inequality that is much smaller than the rise in wage
inequality. These results suggest that the heterogeneity in the ability to accumulate human capital is
an important feature for understanding the effects of SBTC, and interpreting the transformation that
the U.S. economy has gone through since the 1970's. 
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Department of Economics, BRB 3.118
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The Ben-Porath (1967) model of human capital accumulation has been one of the workhorses in
labor economics in the last 40 years. It has been extensively used to understand such issues as
educational attainment, on-the-job training, and wage growth over the life cycle, among others. It
is then perhaps surprising that, with few exceptions, this model has not been applied to study the
signi￿cant changes observed in the U.S. labor markets since the early 1970s. The goal of this paper
is to close this gap. In particular, this paper develops and studies the theoretical implications of
a particular human capital model (which builds on Ben-Porath (1967)) for the evolution of the
wage distribution during this period. The particular model studied is an analytically tractable
overlapping-generations model, where the key novel feature is that individuals di⁄er signi￿cantly in
their ability to accumulate human capital. This is the only source of heterogeneity in this model,
and this assumption is motivated by some recent empirical evidence discussed below.
Speci￿cally, this paper focuses on the following three dimensions of the changes in the wage
distribution from about 1970 to 2000:1
1. The stagnation of median wages (and the slowdown in labor productivity) from about 1973
to 1995 (i.e., changes in the ￿rst moment of the wage distribution).
2. The substantial changes in overall, between-group and within-group wage inequality during
this period (i.e., changes in the second moment of the wage distribution).
3. The relatively small rise in consumption inequality despite the large rise in wage inequality
(i.e., changes in lifetime wage income distribution).
Among the trends mentioned above, perhaps the most puzzling has been the joint behavior
of overall wage inequality and between-group inequality (i.e., the education premium), and in
particular, their movement in opposite directions during the 1970s. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce
(1993) have documented these patterns and stated: ￿The rise in within-group inequality preceded
the increase in returns to observables by over a decade. On the basis of this di⁄erence in timing,
it seems clear to us that there are at least two unique dimensions of skill (education and skill
di⁄erences within an education group) that receive unique prices in the labor market￿(p. 429).
They then added: ￿Our conclusion is that the general rise in inequality and the rise in education
premium are actually distinct economic phenomena￿(p. 412). This widely accepted conclusion has
then led most of the subsequent literature to search for separate driving forces and mechanisms to
explain each of these phenomena.2 Instead, as we elaborate below, this paper proposes a mechanism
that simultaneously generates a monotonic rise in overall inequality and a non-monotonic change
in the education premium, despite the fact that the model has one type of skill.
1For extensive documentation of these trends, see Bound and Johnson (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Murphy
and Welch (1992), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), Card and Lemieux (2001), Acemoglu (2002), Krueger and Perri
(2006), Attanasio, Battistin, and Ichimura (2004), and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2005a,b).
2Some notable exceptions are discussed in the literature review.
2Here are the basic features of the model. Individuals begin life with a ￿xed endowment of ￿raw
labor￿(i.e., strength, health, etc.) and are able to accumulate ￿human capital￿(skills, knowledge,
etc.) over the life cycle. Raw labor and human capital earn separate wages in the labor market
and each individual supplies both of these factors of production at competitively determined prices
(wages). Investment in human capital takes place on-the-job unless it equals 100 percent of an
individual￿ s time, in which case it is interpreted as ￿schooling.￿Individuals who invest full-time
for a speci￿ed number of years are de￿ned as college graduates. We assume that skills are general
(i.e., not ￿rm-speci￿c) and labor markets are competitive. As a result, the cost of human capital
investment will be completely borne by the workers, and ￿rms will adjust the hourly wage rate
downward by the fraction of time invested on the job (Becker (1965)). Thus, the cost of human
capital investment is the forgone earnings while individuals are learning new skills.3
We introduce two features into this framework. First, we assume that individuals di⁄er in
their ability to accumulate human capital. As a result, individuals di⁄er systematically in the
amount of investment they undertake, and consequently, in the growth rate of their wages over
the life cycle. This assumption is consistent with the recent empirical evidence from panel data on
individual wages; see, for example, Lillard and Weiss (1979), Baker (1997), Guvenen (2005, 2006),
and Huggett, Ventura, and Yaron (2005). Thus, wage inequality in the model results entirely from
the systematic fanning out of wage pro￿les over the life cycle.
The demand side of the model consists of a linear production technology that takes raw labor
and human capital as inputs. The second element in the model, and the driving force behind
the non-stationary changes during this period, is skill-biased technical change (SBTC) that occurs
starting in the early 1970s (for empirical evidence on SBTC, see, for example, Berman, Bound,
and Griliches (1994), Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), and Machin and Van Reenen (1998)). A
key di⁄erence of our model is that we do not equate ￿skill￿to education as has often been done
in previous studies. Instead, we interpret skill more broadly as human capital and view SBTC
as a change that raises the productivity of human capital relative to raw labor. This seemingly
small di⁄erence in perspective has important consequences. To see this, note that in this model
all workers have some amount of human capital (which varies by ability and age) and raw labor
(which is the same for all). Therefore, SBTC does not only change wages between education groups
(because of di⁄erences in average human capital levels), but it also a⁄ects wages within each group
di⁄erently, depending on the ability and age of each individual. In this framework education is not
a separate skill with its unique price, but is merely a noisy indicator of an individual￿ s ability to
3The main di⁄erence of this model from the standard Ben-Porath framework comes from our introduction of raw
labor as a second factor of production (in addition to human capital). The main purpose of this modi￿cation is to
introduce the concept of ￿returns to skill￿into the Ben-Porath model, which perhaps surprisingly does not exist in
that model, but which is clearly crucial for studying skill-biased technical change. An advantage of the particular
speci￿cation we propose in this paper is that it retains the analytical tractability of the Ben-Porath framework
allowing us to solve the model in closed form. We elaborate on these points in the next section.
3learn, which in turn is an indicator of his human capital level and of how strongly he responds to
SBTC. Therefore, another feature of this model is that it allows us to study both between-group
and within-group inequality simultaneously.
The linear production function allows us to solve the model in closed form, derive explicit ex-
pressions for the moments of the wage and consumption distributions, and establish our results
theoretically. In addition to this analytical convenience, however, the linear form (i.e., perfect
substitutability) plays another important role. With imperfect substitution, the college premium
would be negatively related to the relative supply of college graduates. Several authors have em-
phasized this link to argue that the fall in the college premium during the 1970s resulted from
the rapid increase in the supply of college-educated workers (cf., Katz and Murphy (1992), Juhn,
Murphy, and Pierce (1993)). When the production function is linear, however, this link is broken.
Therefore, we use this linear technology to highlight a di⁄erent mechanism, and to show that our
results￿ and especially the non-monotonic behavior of the college premium￿ are not driven by the
relative supply channel emphasized in earlier work. Of course, in reality both channels are probably
operational and are complementary to each other.
We ￿rst examine the behavior of average wages in response to SBTC. Under a fairly mild
assumption, the model generates stagnation in average wages in the short run after SBTC and a
rise in the long run. The mechanism can be explained as follows. Because SBTC raises the returns
to human capital at all future dates, it leads to a permanent increase in investment rates, since
individuals are forward-looking. While this higher investment results in an immediate increase
in costs (in the form of forgone earnings), its bene￿ts are realized gradually as the total stock of
human capital slowly increases. As a result, observed wages fall in the short run, due to increased
investment on the job, and inherit the sluggish growth of the human capital stock thereafter.
Second, a closely related mechanism generates the non-monotonic behavior of the college pre-
mium during SBTC. Basically, because college graduates have higher learning ability than those
with lower education, their investment increases more in response to SBTC. This di⁄erential in-
crease in immediate costs (i.e., forgone earnings) results in a fall in their relative wages in the
short run. In the long run, however, this higher investment yields a larger increase in their human
capital stock, leading to a higher college premium. Third, it is also easy to see that the described
mechanism will a⁄ect younger workers￿ who have a longer horizon and thus expect larger bene-
￿ts from investing￿ more than older ones, resulting in a more pronounced decline in the college
premium among younger workers, consistent with empirical evidence (Katz and Murphy (1992),
Card and Lemieux (2001)). Fourth, despite the fall in the college premium in the short run, it can
be shown that overall wage inequality rises in the model during the same time (proposition 5).
Therefore, taken together the second and fourth results show that this model is consistent with the
joint behavior of overall wage inequality and between-group inequality observed in the U.S. data
mentioned above.
4Fifth, and ￿nally, the rise in lifetime income inequality in the model is signi￿cantly smaller than
the rise in wage inequality. In the model, a high price of human capital generates larger cross-
sectional wage inequality because of a fanning out of wage pro￿les (see ￿gure 1). However, note
that those individuals who experience a large increase in their wages later in life are exactly those
who make larger investments and accept lower wages early on. Because future gains are discounted
compared to the early losses in calculating lifetime income, the rise in lifetime inequality remains
small. Therefore, the model o⁄ers a new mechanism that rationalizes a small change in lifetime
inequality with the large increase in wage inequality.
The model presented in the current paper is too stylized to be taken to data directly. In
a companion paper (Guvenen and Kuruscu (2006)), we relax several assumptions made in the
current paper for analytical tractability, and introduce some important missing features￿ such as
replacing the perfect foresight assumption about future skill prices with Bayesian learning, allowing
for imperfect substitution in the production function, and introducing uncertainty, among others.
The detailed quantitative analysis in that paper shows that the main mechanisms highlighted in
this paper continue to play a central role, and the main conclusions of this paper carry over to that
more general case.
There is a vast literature on the empirical trends that motivate this paper. A short list of these
papers is mentioned in footnote 1; for excellent surveys of the literature see Katz and Autor (1999)
and Acemoglu (2002). An important precursor to our paper is Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998),
who quantitatively examine the implications of an overlapping-generations model of human capital
accumulation for some of the trends mentioned above. To our knowledge, their paper was the ￿rst
one to emphasize that with human capital accumulation skill prices and observed wages di⁄er, and
that this could be important for understanding the recent evolution of the U.S. wage distribution.
Our paper however also di⁄ers from theirs in several important respects. First, the framework
studied here extends the Ben-Porath model to allow for returns to skill, but is still analytically
very tractable. As a result, we are able to solve the model in closed form and establish all our
results theoretically. Second, a central thesis of our paper is that individuals di⁄er signi￿cantly in
their ability to accumulate human capital and this feature is behind most of the results derived in
this paper, whereas heterogeneity in ability is quantitatively very small in Heckman et al (1998,
see ￿gure 3). Finally, in the long run after SBTC all measures of inequality increase in the present
paper, whereas many of them fall in that paper.
Several studies before us have emphasized the role of a rapid increase in skill demand for ris-
ing wage inequality. Important examples include Hornstein and Krusell (1996), Greenwood and
Yorukoglu (1997), Galor and Tsiddon (1998), Caselli (1999), Aghion, Howitt, and Violante (2002),
and Violante (2002). Greenwood and Yorukoglu emphasize the role of skill in facilitating the
adoption of new technologies. They argue that the advent of computer technologies in the 1970s
presented such a change, which increased the wages of skilled workers and resulted in a productivity
5slowdown due to the time it takes to utilize the new technologies e⁄ectively. Hornstein and Krusell
also make a similar observation, but add that the acceleration in quality improvements during this
period has exacerbated measurement problems, further reducing measured productivity growth.
Caselli (1999) studies a model where di⁄erences in innate ability and newer technologies that are
more costly to learn than existing ones result in a rising skill premium. Violante (2002) develops
a model of within-group inequality, in which vintage-speci￿c skills, embodied technological accel-
eration, and labor market frictions combine to generate rising inequality. These papers share the
feature that technical change is ￿embodied￿in new machines; instead in our paper, it is ￿disem-
bodied.￿It is possible to argue that both types of technological changes have been taking place
during this period, so the mechanisms emphasized in these papers are complementary to ours.4
Several papers have proposed explanations for the (non-monotonic) behavior of the college
premium during this period. In an in￿ uential paper, Katz and Murphy (1992) show that a simple
supply-demand framework provides a very good ￿t to the observed behavior of the college premium.
Acemoglu (1998) goes one step further and proposes a model to endogenize the demand for skill:
essentially, a large rise in the supply of college workers causes ￿rms to direct their innovations
to take advantage of this supply, creating an endogenous skill-bias in technological progress. He
also shows that an extension of this model with two skills is potentially consistent with the joint
behavior of college premium and total wage inequality. Similarly, Krusell et al. (2000) show that
an increased demand for skills can result if capital and skills are complementary in the production
function, and technical change is investment-speci￿c. Galor and Moav (2000) discuss an extension
of their baseline model that can also explain the joint behavior of college premium and total wage
inequality.5 As noted above, a common feature in these papers (as well as in Heckman et al (1998))
is the central role played by the relative supply of skill, which arises from a production function
with imperfect substitution between workers with di⁄erent skill levels. Instead, here we eliminate
the e⁄ect of relative supply on skill prices, and emphasize a di⁄erent channel that works through
the di⁄erential human capital investment response of di⁄erent groups to SBTC. In addition, the
joint behavior of between-group and overall inequality in this model results from a single driving
force.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model. Section 3 presents the
theoretical analysis and establishes the results described above. Section 4 discusses some possible
extensions, and Section 5 concludes.
4In section 4 we consider a version of our baseline model with embodied technical change, and argue that such an
extension may be important for explaining the behavior of college enrollment in the short run after SBTC (which was
stagnant in the 1970￿ s in the U.S data). However, this version of the model has implications similar to the baseline
case for the evolution of the wage distribution, which is the main focus of this paper, and is not as tractable as the
baseline model. So we do not analyze it in more detail.
5Gould, Moav, and Weinberg (2001) develop a model that can also generate the di⁄erent behaviors of between-
and within-group inequality during this period. However, their explanation relies on the existence of two separate
sources of inequality growth.
62 A Baseline Model
2.1 Human Capital Accumulation Decision
The economy consists of overlapping generations of individuals who live for S years. Individuals
begin life with an endowment of ￿raw labor￿(i.e., strength, health, etc.), which is the same across
individuals and constant over the life cycle, and are able to accumulate ￿human capital￿(skills,
knowledge, etc.) over the life cycle, which is the only skill that can be accumulated in this economy.
There is a continuum of individuals in every cohort, indexed by j 2 [0;1], who di⁄er in their ability
to accumulate human capital, denoted by e Aj (also referred to as their ￿type￿ ). This is the only
source of heterogeneity in the model.
Each individual has one unit of time endowment in each period that can be allocated between
producing output and accumulating human capital. Let l denote raw labor and hj;s denote the
human capital of an s-year-old individual of type j. We assume that raw labor and human cap-
ital earn separate wages in the labor market, and each individual supplies both of these factors
of production at competitively determined wage rates. Therefore, the ￿potential income￿ of an
individual￿ that is, the income he would earn if he spent all his time producing for his employer￿
is given by PLl + PHhj;s, where PL and PH are the rental prices of raw labor and human capital,
respectively. (For clarity of notation, we suppress the dependence of variables on time, except when
we speci￿cally want to emphasize time variation.)
Following the standard interpretation of the Ben-Porath (1967) model, we assume that invest-
ment in human capital takes place on-the-job unless it equals 100 percent of an individual￿ s time, in
which case it is interpreted as ￿schooling.￿We assume that skills are general (i.e., not ￿rm-speci￿c)
and labor markets are competitive. As a result, the cost of human capital investment will be com-
pletely borne by workers, and ￿rms will adjust the hourly wage rate downward by the fraction of
time invested on the job (Becker (1965)). Then, the observed wage income of an individual is given
by
wj;s = [PLl + PHhj;s](1 ￿ ij;s) = [PLl + PHhj;s]
| {z }
Potential earnings




where ij;s is the fraction of time spent on human capital investment, henceforth referred to as
￿investment time.￿Thus, wage income can be written as the potential earnings minus the ￿cost of
investment,￿which is simply the forgone earnings while individuals are learning new skills. Since
labor supply is inelastic (i.e., conditional on working, all workers supply one unit of time per period),
wj;s is also the observed (hourly) wage rate.
Individuals begin their life with zero human capital, hj;0 = 0; and accumulate human capital
7according to the following technology:
hj;s+1 = hj;s + Qj;s; (2)
where Qj;s is the newly produced human capital, which will be referred to simply as ￿investment￿
in the rest of the paper, and should not be confused with investment time (ij;s). New human capital
is produced by combining the existing stocks of raw labor and human capital with the available
investment time according to
Qj;s = e Aj((￿Ll + ￿Hhj;s)ij;s)￿: (3)
The key parameter in this speci￿cation is e Aj, which determines the productivity of learning.
Due to the heterogeneity in e Aj, individuals will di⁄er systematically in the amount of investment
they undertake, and consequently, in the growth rate of their wages over the life cycle. Another
important parameter is ￿ 2 [0;1]; which determines the degree of diminishing marginal returns
in the human capital production function. A low value of ￿ implies higher diminishing returns,
in which case it is optimal to spread out investment over time. In contrast, when ￿ is high, the
marginal return on investment does not fall quickly, and investment becomes bunched over time. In
the extreme case when ￿ = 1, individuals will spend either all their time on investment (ij;s = 1) or
none at all in a given period. Finally, the parameters ￿L and ￿H determine the relative contributions
of each factor to human capital accumulation, and could be time-varying as well.
2.2 Individual￿ s Dynamic Problem
We assume that individuals can borrow and lend at a constant interest rate (denoted by r), which
implies that markets are complete. As is well-known, in this case the consumption-savings and
income maximization decisions can be disentangled from each other. Therefore, for the purposes of












[PLl + PHhj;s](1 ￿ ij;s)
#
subject to (2); (3), and hj;0 = 0: It should be stressed that this formulation does not rest on the
assumption of risk-neutrality, but only requires markets to be complete.
82.3 Aggregate Production Technology














hj;s (1 ￿ ij;s)dj;
where ￿(s) is the (discrete) measure of s-year-old individuals, and the sums are thus taken over
the distribution of individuals of all types and ages.6 The superscript ￿net￿indicates that these
variables measure the actual amounts of each factor used in production (that is, net of the time
allocated to human capital investment) to distinguish them from the ￿total stocks￿of these factors
available in the economy, which are de￿ned later below. The aggregate ￿rm uses these two inputs





where Z is the total factor productivity (TFP). For simplicity we assume that capital is not used
in production. Note that raw labor and human capital enter the aggregate production function
and human capital production in a symmetric manner and with the same productivity parameters
(compare (4) to (3)).7 This assumption allows us to solve the model in closed form.
The ￿rm solves a static problem by hiring factors from households every period to maximize its
pro￿t: Y ￿ PLLnet ￿ PHHnet: As a result, factor prices are given by the marginal products
PH = @Y=@Hnet = ￿H and PL = @Y=@Lnet = ￿L:
It is useful to compare this production structure to that assumed in some of the previous




1=￿ ; where now H and L denote the total work hours of college and high-
6For the population structure assumed so far, ￿(s) = 1=S:
7When studying the quantitative implications of this model (Guvenen and Kuruscu (2006)), we have experimented
with three other speci￿cations of the human capital accumulation function that also seemed a priori plausible. In
particular, we wrote the human capital function as e Aj((￿L;tl+￿H;thj;s)ij;s)
￿ and considered (i) weights that remain
constant through SBTC: ￿L;t = ￿L and ￿H;t = ￿H; (ii) an aggregate production function that features imperfect
substitution between raw labor and human capital, and weights that are proportional to wages: ￿L;t = PL;t and
￿H;t = PH;t; and (iii) no role for raw labor in human capital production: ￿L;t = 0 and ￿H;t = 1: The ￿rst two cases
had implications qualitatively similar to the baseline model described here, while the third displayed some implausible
behavior even in steady state (that is, without SBTC). Overall, and perhaps surprisingly, the simplest speci￿cation we
adopt here for analytical convenience (given in equation (3)) also turned out to have the most plausible quantitative
implications.
9school workers, respectively. Therefore, in these models, a change in ￿H=￿L due to SBTC has the
same e⁄ect on all individuals within a given education group. Instead, here we interpret skill more
broadly as human capital and do not equate it to education. Since all workers in this model have
some amount of human capital (which varies by ability and age) and raw labor (which is the same
for all), SBTC not only changes wages between education groups (because of di⁄erences in average
human capital levels), but also a⁄ects wages within each group di⁄erently, depending on the ability
and age of each individual. In this sense, this model allows us to study both between-group and
within-group inequality simultaneously.
A second implication of the production function assumed in earlier studies is that the education
premium is given by PH=PL = (￿H=￿L)
￿ (H=L)
￿￿1 and is therefore decreasing in the relative supply
of college graduates. Several authors have emphasized this link to argue that the fall in the college
premium during the 1970s resulted from the rapid increase in the supply of college-educated workers
(cf., Katz and Murphy (1992), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993)). However, notice that when the
production function is linear, this link is broken: PH=PL = ￿H=￿L. Thus, we use this linear
production technology to show that the non-monotonic behavior of the college premium in this
paper is not driven by the relative supply channel emphasized in earlier work.
2.4 Analyzing the Individual￿ s Problem
We now rewrite the problem to simplify the exposition. Using equation (3), the opportunity cost
of investing an amount Qj;s can be written as

















(￿Ll + ￿Hhj;s ￿ Cj(Qj;s))
#
subject to
hj;s+1 = hj;s + Qj;s; with hj;0 = 0:














where we make explicit the dependence of future prices of human capital on time. The left-hand
side of this equation is the marginal cost, and the right-hand side is the marginal bene￿t (MB)
10of investment. The latter is the present discounted value of the future stream of wages that is
earned by an additional unit of human capital. An important implication of (5) is that an expected
increase in the future prices of skill (the sequence ￿H(t)) will have an immediate impact on current
investment decisions because of the forward-looking nature of this equation.
No Returns to Skill in the Ben-Porath Model￿ The optimality condition (5) highlights an im-
portant di⁄erence between the current framework and the Ben-Porath model. In the latter, the














where W (t) is the wage rate in period t; which in turn equals the price of human capital since it
is the only factor of production in that model. Now, suppose that the economy is in steady state
with W (t) = W for all t, and consider the e⁄ect of a one-time permanent increase in the wage
rate. This change will only have an e⁄ect on investment in the ￿rst period, but not after that.
This is because a permanently higher W will increase both the cost and the bene￿t of investment
by the same amount, after the ￿rst period. Therefore, the price of human capital in this standard
model does not capture what we think of as a ￿return on human capital investment.￿ 8 In contrast,
in the present framework SBTC takes the form of a permanent increase in ￿H relative to ￿L.
This increases the bene￿t of human capital investment (right-hand side of (5)) relative to the cost
of investment (left-hand side), and therefore increases the incentives to invest in human capital
permanently, without necessarily implying anything about TFP growth.
We now return to analyzing the individual￿ s problem. To illustrate how the model works,
consider two economies that di⁄er only in the price of human capital, ￿H and ￿0
H with ￿0
H > ￿H.
Figure 1 compares the wage pro￿les of individuals with di⁄erent ability levels in these two cases.
First, note the features common to both cases: workers with high ability invest more than others,
accepting lower wages early on in return for higher wages later in life. As a result, wage inequality
increases over the life cycle due to the systematic fanning out of the wage pro￿les. Workers with
ability level above a certain threshold invest full time early in life (i.e., they attend college).
A comparison of these two economies reveals a number of important points that are key to
understanding the results of this paper about the long-run e⁄ects of SBTC. First, a higher price of
human capital induces more investment, where the strength of this response increases with ability.
As a result, cross-sectional wage inequality increases due to the fanning out of wage pro￿les. Notice,
however, that lifetime income inequality will not rise as much as cross-sectional wage inequality
because those with high wages later on are exactly those who invest more, and therefore have low
8Although it is possible to generate a persistent increase in investment rates by increasing the growth rate of W,
there is no evidence of increased TFP growth after the 1970s; in fact there is ample evidence to the contrary.
11Figure 1: The E⁄ect of the Returns to Human Capital on Life-Cycle Wage Pro￿les
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wages early in the life cycle. Moreover, since lifetime income is a discounted average of wages over
the life cycle, later gains are discounted compared to early losses, so the rise in the lifetime income
of high ability individuals remains modest.
3 Theoretical Analysis
In this section we consider a simpli￿ed demographic structure that allows us to establish our main
results theoretically. In particular we specialize to the ￿perpetual youth￿version of the overlapping-
generations model as in Blanchard (1985): individuals can potentially live forever (S = 1) but face
a constant probability of death (1 ￿ ￿) every period. Under this assumption, s is no longer a state
variable in the human capital problem, simplifying the analysis substantially. We normalize the
population size to one, and assume that each period a cohort of measure (1 ￿ ￿) is born to replace the
individuals who die. Therefore, the measure of an s-year-old cohort is given by ￿(s) = (1￿￿)￿s￿1.
In the rest of the analysis, we restrict our attention to an interior solution; hence we assume that
wj;s ￿ 0 for all j;s: This provides analytical tractability.9 Finally, we assume that r = 1=(￿￿) ￿ 1;
where ￿ is the pure time discount rate. This assumption implies that individuals choose a constant
9This assumption is not as restrictive as it might seem, since it can be satis￿ed by rescaling l to a larger value.
The theoretical results that follow do not depend on the particular value of l:
12consumption path over the life cycle.
Characterizing the Steady State Before SBTC
To examine the e⁄ects of SBTC, we assume that the economy is in steady state in the period
preceding the shock, and characterize how investment, wages, and consumption are determined. In
this initial steady state, let ￿H(t) = ￿H and ￿L(t) = ￿L for all t.
The assumption of constant survival probability simpli￿es the structure of the model in many






where the marginal bene￿t of investment is now constant, since the expected life span is now








where Aj ￿ e A
1=1￿￿
j . The fact that Qj is independent of age implies that the human capital stock at
age s is simply hj;s = Qj(s￿1): Furthermore, this optimal investment choice satis￿es the following









This expression makes clear that the cost of investment evaluated at the optimal investment
level depends on j only through Qj, implying that the subscript j can be dropped from the cost
function: Cj(Qj) = C(Qj). The optimal amount of investment time, ij;s, is given by the total cost











+ (s ￿ 1)
￿￿1
: (7)
A few intuitive results can be seen from these expressions. First, equation (6) implies that
individuals with higher ability make larger investments: dQj=dAj > 0. Second, even though
individuals increase their human capital stock by a constant amount Qj every period, investment
time falls with age: dij;s=ds < 0: Third, equations (6) and (7) can be combined to show that
dij;s=dAj > 0 : conditional on age, individuals with higher ability also devote a larger fraction of
their time investing in human capital. Finally, and most importantly, the increase in investment
time in response to SBTC is larger for individuals with higher ability: d2ij;s=d￿HdAj > 0: These
results play a central role for the results that we prove below.
13We are now ready to derive an expression for the average wage rate in the economy. In order
to express the average wage in an easily interpretable form, it is convenient to de￿ne some new


























































and L measure the aggregate human capital stock and raw labor, inclusive of
on-the-job investment activities, which should not be confused with Hnet and Lnet de￿ned earlier.
At a given point in time, Q and C(Q) only depend on the future values of ￿H, whereas the
stock of human capital only depends on past levels of investment, which in turn is determined
by the history of ￿H￿ s.10 Therefore, the former variables will adjust immediately in response to





adjust only gradually (making it a ￿stock variable￿ ). This distinction will play a crucial role in the
analysis below.
Now, using the de￿nition of an individual￿ s wage in equation (1), the average wage rate in the


















in equation (10) is only valid in steady state when all past returns were
constant. Similarly, the de￿nitions of Q and C(Q) are valid when all future returns are constant.




and C(Q) we obtain









Optimal consumption choice.￿ Given the interest rate r = 1=(￿￿)￿1; the optimal consumption
path is constant over the life cycle, and is given by the fraction (1 ￿ ￿￿) of individuals￿lifetime















Comparing the last two formulas, it is easy to see that average consumption is less than average
wage (c < w) whenever ￿ < 1: The reason can be explained as follows. Given that the interest
rate equals the reciprocal of the e⁄ective discount rate (￿￿); individuals would like to maintain a
constant consumption over their lifetime. But because all individuals have upward-sloping wage
pro￿les, they need to borrow against their future income to maintain a constant consumption path.
With a positive interest rate, part of aggregate labor income goes toward paying the interest that
accrues on borrowed funds (which, for simplicity, is assumed to be borrowed from the rest of the
world). Consequently, average consumption is less than the average wage in the economy.
Characterizing the Behavior after SBTC
In the following subsections, we consider a one-time permanent increase, at time t￿; in the price
of human capital from ￿H to ￿0
H; while the price of raw labor, ￿L; remains constant.11 We analyze
the behavior of average wages (and labor productivity), the college premium, and overall wage
inequality both in the short run and in the long run. For the short-run analysis, we focus our
attention to the period immediately after the shock. Analyzing the economy in this time period
captures the fact that, in the short run, the human capital stock does not fully adjust yet, but
investment jumps to its new level immediately.12
3.1 Stagnation of Average Wages (and the Slowdown in Labor Productivity)
Labor economists and macroeconomists have documented two closely related trends during this
period: the stagnation of median wage growth and the slowdown in labor productivity growth,
11Since ￿L remains unchanged and ￿H increases, SBTC entails a true improvement in aggregate productivity in
these experiments. An alternative way of modeling SBTC would be to assume that the rise in ￿H is matched by a
symmetric fall in ￿L: Almost all the results studied in the next section carry over to this case, and some of them
become easier to prove. For example, the decline in average wage in the short run would be larger in this case.
Similarly, consumption inequality would increase even less compared to wage inequality after SBTC. To show that
these results do not follow trivially from the decline in ￿L, we assume that ￿L is ￿xed and ￿H increases.
12In Guvenen and Kuruscu (2006) we model SBTC as a gradual change in the price of human capital that takes
place over several years, and we show that the main conclusions drawn here remain valid.
15which both started with a sharp fall in 1973 and persisted until about 1995. For example, the
median real wage has increased by 2.2 percent per year between 1963 and 1973, but actually fell by
0.3 percent per year between 1973 and 1989 (Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993)). Similarly, labor
productivity (measured as the non-farm business output per hour) has grown by 2.6 percent per
year from 1955 to 1973, but only by 1.45 percent per year from 1973 to 1995.13
To develop the implications of the model, ￿rst consider the average wage in the economy in the
initial steady state:
wI ￿ wjt<t￿ =
￿










gradually. Therefore, the average wage immediately after SBTC (in the short run) is given by


















, and the average
wage in the new steady state is given by









Price, Investment and Quantity E⁄ects.￿ It is instructive to decompose the changes in the
average wage after SBTC into three components. First, using equations (14) and (15), the short-
run response of the average wage can be written as























First, for a ￿xed stock of human capital, an increase in ￿H increases the wage rate. We call
this the ￿price e⁄ect.￿Second, a higher ￿H also induces more investment, which reduces the wage
rate by increasing the forgone earnings. We refer to this as the ￿investment e⁄ect.￿ Therefore,
the short-run response of the average wage is entirely determined by the relative strengths of these
counteracting forces. In other words, whether or not the average wage falls in the short run depends
on whether the investment e⁄ect dominates the price e⁄ect. Below we examine the conditions under
which this outcome obtains.
13Authors￿calculation from the Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
16Figure 2: Combinations of (￿;r) That Satisfy Condition 1 (Shaded Region)



















































Similarly, using equations (15) and (16) we have














which shows that the only change between the short run and the long run is the (slow) adjustment
of the human capital stock. We call this long-run channel the ￿quantity e⁄ect.￿Finally, adding up
equations (17) and (18) shows that the total e⁄ect of SBTC on the average wage (wLR ￿ wI) can
simply be written as the sum of the price, investment, and quantity e⁄ects. We will use analogous
decompositions to examine the e⁄ect of SBTC on other variables below, where the main idea will
be the same as here.
Before we can state the main result of this section, we need the following condition, which





Figure 2 illustrates the parameter combinations that satisfy condition 1. From equation (17), it
is clear that the investment e⁄ect would dominate the price e⁄ect if either the initial stock of human
capital is low so that the price e⁄ect is small, or the response of investment is high. The latter
is, in turn, mainly determined by two parameters. First, the response of investment to SBTC is
larger when ￿ is high. This is because, as noted earlier, a higher ￿ implies less diminishing marginal
17returns in human capital production. Consequently, there is little bene￿t from spreading investment
over time (as would be the case if ￿ were low.) Second, for a given (￿;￿), a higher ￿ makes the
present discounted value of future wages larger, implying a higher bene￿t from a given increase in
the price of human capital. Thus, the response of investment to SBTC increases with ￿ (and the
corresponding low interest rate). At the same time, the stock of human capital is increasing in the
survival probability, so the price e⁄ect is more likely to dominate the investment e⁄ect when ￿ is
large.14 The combination of these three forces gives rise to the the region of admissible parameters
shown in Figure 2. This region contains a fairly wide range of plausible parameter combinations.
For example, assuming an expected working life of 50 years and an interest rate of 5 percent, any
curvature value above 0.71 satis￿es condition 1. Estimates of this parameter are typically around
0.8 and higher (see, for example, Heckman (1976), and more recently, Heckman, Lochner, and
Taber (1998) and Kuruscu (2006)). The following proposition characterizes the behavior of average
wages.
Proposition 1 (Stagnation of Average Wages) In response to SBTC, for all ￿0
H > ￿H; the
average wage (alternatively, labor productivity)
1. increases in the long run, i.e., wLR > wI:
2. falls in the short run, i.e., wSR < wI, if condition 1 holds.
Proof. See Appendix A for all the omitted proofs and derivations.
It should be emphasized that for a marginal increase in ￿H, condition 1 is not only su¢ cient
but also necessary for the average wage to decline in the short run. However, if the increase in the
price of human capital is larger, the average wage would decline under a weaker condition, making
condition 1 su¢ cient but not necessary in general.
The transition path of the average wage after SBTC is easy to characterize: since the stock
of human capital increases monotonically over time, it can be seen (by comparing equations (15)
and (16)) that after the initial decline the average wage also increases monotonically over time.
Furthermore, di⁄erent measures of the length of this transition can be computed explicitly (proofs
in the appendix).
Corollary 1 After the initial decline, the average wage increases monotonically to its new steady
state level. The time it takes for the average wage to complete half of the transition toward the new
steady state, wt1 = wSR + (wLR ￿ wSR)=2, is given by t1 = ￿log2=log￿:
14It should be stressed that all three parameters a⁄ect both the price and investment e⁄ects (which can be seen
from equations (8,9,10). So the discussion here, for example, of the impact of ￿ on the cost of investment only
highlights the stronger of the two e⁄ects it has (even though it a⁄ects both the price and investment e⁄ects).
18See the appendix for the derivation of t1. Notice that the half-life of the transition depends
only on the survival probability, which determines the average age in the economy. In particular,
when the population is young on average (￿ is small) the transition is faster. Loosely speaking, in
this case individuals born before SBTC (who invested at a lower rate for years) are replaced more
quickly with younger generations, which increases the average human capital stock more quickly.
For plausible parameter values the transition could be quite slow: for ￿ = 0:98 (average working
life of 50 years), t1 = 35 years, and for ￿ = 0:96 (average working life of 25 years), t1 = 17 years.
However, note that these numbers do not necessarily imply that the average wage will stay below
its initial steady state value for this long. An alternative measure of convergence speed is the time
it takes for the wage to return to its level before the shock (formula reported in Appendix A; see
equation (29)). For ￿ = ￿ = 0:98 and assuming an increase in ￿H of 50 percent implies that the
average wage stays below its initial level for 21 years. If ￿ = ￿ = 0:96; the corresponding duration
is 11 years. Overall, these back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the average wage can
stagnate below its initial level for a decade or perhaps longer, and the convergence to the ￿nal
steady state is likely to be even slower.
Finally, there would be no stagnation in average wages without the endogenous response of
investment to SBTC. Thus, the human capital response is essential for these results. The following
corollary states this.
Corollary 2 If individuals￿investment behavior did not respond to SBTC (i.e., Q0
j;s = Qj;s for
all j;s) the average wage would immediately jump after SBTC from its initial steady state value to
￿nal steady state value.
3.2 Between-Group Wage Inequality (College Premium)
The wages of college graduates declined throughout the 1970s relative to the wages of less-educated
individuals. Starting in the early 1980s this trend reversed course, and the college premium in-
creased sharply in the subsequent two decades. For example, the average male college graduate
earned 52 percent more than a high-school graduate in 1970; this premium fell to 41 percent in 1979
and increased back to 84 percent by 2000 (Autor, et al (2005a)). In this section, we characterize
the behavior of the college premium in the model. We show that under condition 1, SBTC leads
to a non-monotonic change in the college premium similar to that observed in the data.
Consistent with the standard interpretation of the Ben-Porath model, the perspective adopted
in this paper is that educational labels merely represent some threshold level for the human capital
investment completed. Thus, a ￿college graduate￿ is de￿ned as an individual who has invested
19above a certain threshold in a speci￿ed number of periods.15 Since there is a one-to-one relationship
between investment time and ability at every age, there is a corresponding threshold ability level
above which all individuals (Aj > Aj￿) become college graduates. However, this threshold depends
on the price of human capital and will therefore change in response to SBTC. In the following, we
abstract from these changes in Aj￿: This is because allowing for changes in Aj￿ would a⁄ect the
ability composition of each education group over time, thereby potentially confounding the e⁄ects
of changes in the premium on education with changes in the returns to ability. Hence, we ￿x the
ability distribution of each group and analyze how their wages change in response to SBTC.
Let Qc and Ec [A] denote the average investment and average ability of college graduates,
respectively. We de￿ne Qn; and En [A] in an analogous fashion for individuals without a college
degree. From the discussion above, it is clear that Ec [A] > En [A]; which also implies Qc > Qn
from equation (8). Finally, let wc (alternatively wn) be the average wage of college (high school)


















































































The following proposition characterizes the behavior of the college premium.
Proposition 2 (Behavior of College Premium) In response to SBTC, for all ￿0
H > ￿H; the
college premium
(i) rises in the long run, i.e., !￿
LR > !￿
I,
(ii) falls in the short run, i.e., !￿
SR < !￿
I, if condition 1 holds.




￿g ￿ Sc; where i
￿ is the investment time threshold
(which is equal to 1 in the standard Ben-Porath model), e s is the individual￿ s current age, and Sc is the number of
years of schooling required to qualify as a college graduate.
20Despite the similarities between the statements of propositions 1 and 2, there is an important
di⁄erence between the two. While the stagnation of average wages only requires the endogenous
response of human capital investment to SBTC (i.e., that C (Q) increases after the shock), the
fall in the college premium requires, in addition, that this response be di⁄erent across education
groups. In other words, if heterogeneity in ability was eliminated from the model, average wages
would still stagnate after SBTC, but the college premium would not fall in the short run.16
Since college graduates accumulate skills faster than high school graduates, the college premium
increases monotonically toward the new steady state value after the initial fall. Moreover, it can
be easily shown that the response of the college premium is proportional to the ability di⁄erential
between college and high school graduates.
Corollary 3 In response to SBTC, the decline (increase) in the college premium in the short run
(long run) is larger, when the ability di⁄erential between college graduates and high school graduates,
Ec [A]=En [A]; is larger.
Decomposing the College Premium.￿ To understand the behavior of the college premium fur-
ther, an intuitive discussion is helpful. For the sake of this discussion, assume that there are no
di⁄erences in ability within each education group, and the investment levels are denoted by Qc and
Qn for college and non-college groups, respectively. However, investment time will vary within each
education group due to di⁄erences in age, and hence, in potential earnings. Using the expression
for investment time in (7), we can rewrite the college premium as
!￿ =
￿Ll + ￿HH (Qc)





l + (￿H=￿L)H (Qc)





1 ￿ in | {z }
G2
; (21)
where all the variables that appear in this expression are de￿ned as before, but the averages are
now taken with respect to the group indicated by the subscript.17
The ￿rst term in the decomposition, G1; captures the price and quantity e⁄ects of changes
in ￿H. Both of these e⁄ects are larger for college graduates because they have a larger human
capital stock, and moreover, their human capital stock increases more after SBTC (though the
latter happens only gradually). The key point to note is that there is no reason for G1 to behave
in any way other than increase monotonically after SBTC. If there was no investment response in
16It should be clear from this discussion that one can prove a result analogous to corollary 2 for the college premium:
if individuals￿investment did not respond to SBTC, the college premium would immediately jump from its initial
steady state to its ￿nal steady state value.
17ic is the average investment time of college graduates, which is calculated as the ratio of each individual￿ s potential
earnings (￿Ll + ￿HQc(s ￿ 1)) to average potential earnings of that group (￿Ll + ￿H
￿
1￿￿Qc) as weights. in is de￿ned
analogously.
21the model, G2 would be constant over time and the college premium would be proportional to G1
and would also increase monotonically.
The di⁄erential investment response captured by G2 is thus crucial for the initial decline in the
college premium. There are two reasons for the initial decline in G2. First, after SBTC college
graduates increase their investment time more than high school graduates. In the long run, this
follows from the fact that d2ij;s=d￿HdAj > 0 mentioned above. The same can be shown to be
true in the short run.18 A second and reinforcing e⁄ect responsible for the fall in G2 is that the
initial level of investment time is larger for college graduates. As a result, even the same amount of








: Overall, then, the college
premium falls initially because G2 (which depends on the jump variables, ic and in) falls quickly,
but then recovers as G1 gradually increases over time.
3.2.1 College Premium Within Age Groups
A well-documented fact is that the behavior of the college premium in the United States during
this period has been di⁄erent for di⁄erent experience groups (see Katz and Murphy (1992) and
Murphy and Welch (1992)). In particular, these authors show that the fall and rise in the overall
college premium were largely attributable to this behavior among individuals with less experience.
In contrast, the fall and rise in the premium among more experienced individuals have been very
much muted. Similarly, Card and Lemieux (2001) focus on age groups (rather than experience),
and examine data from the United Kingdom and Canada in addition to the United States. They
￿nd the same pattern to emerge in these countries as well.
To examine this issue, we now look at the college premium among s-year-old individuals, which
is given in the ￿rst steady state by
!￿
I (s) =
￿Ll + ￿HQc(s ￿ 1) ￿ C(Qc)
￿Ll + ￿HQn(s ￿ 1) ￿ C(Qn)
: (22)
Similarly, the premium in the short run and in the long run after SBTC is de￿ned analogously
to equations (19) and (20).
Proposition 3 (Behavior of College Premium Within Age Groups) De￿ne s = 1 +
￿￿￿
1￿￿￿
and s = 1 +
￿￿￿
(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿). Then in response to SBTC, the college premium among s-year-old indi-
viduals








HQ: It is clear that ￿ > 0:5 is a su¢ cient condition for this




HQ) is large enough.
22Table 1: Evolution of College Premium Within Age Groups After SBTC
College premium within s-year-old individuals:
If s satis￿es: s ￿s s< s <s s￿ s
Short run: Declines Declines Increases
log(!￿
SR (s)=!￿
I (s)) (< 0) (< 0) (> 0)
Long run: Declines Increases Increases
log(!￿
LR (s)=!￿
I (s)) (< 0) (> 0) (> 0)
Notes: See proposition 3 for the de￿nitions of s and s: The table displays the behavior of the college premium
for a marginal increase in ￿H:
(i) falls in the short run, !￿
SR (s) < !￿
I (s), if and only if s < s,
(ii) rises in the long run, !￿
LR (s) > !￿
I (s), if and only if s > s.
An important di⁄erence of this proposition from the previous one is that here the decline in the
college premium for young individuals does not require condition 1, and therefore, holds under more
general conditions than proposition 2. Furthermore, from proposition 3, it is also easy to conjecture
that whether the average college premium falls in the short run will depend on whether there are
su¢ ciently many young individuals in the population. In fact, this is exactly what condition 1 in
proposition 2 ensures: the condition that the average age in the population be less than s (that is,
1=(1 ￿ ￿) < s) is exactly the same as condition 1.
Proposition 3 partitions the population into three age groups,19 where the college premium
displays distinct behaviors (shown in Table 1). To explain the intuition for these results, it is
convenient to take a ￿rst-order Taylor series approximation to the college premium for s-year-old



































































Di⁄erential Quantity E⁄ect (>0)
;
19The necessity part of the proposition (the ￿only if￿part) applies for a marginal increase in ￿H: For larger increases,
s < s is a su¢ cient condition for the college premium to decline, but not a necessary condition. The same comment
applies to part (ii) of the proposition. The reason we consider this stronger form of the proposition is because it
allows us to divide the age range into three distinct groups in table 1.
23(up to a constant scaling factor).20 Adding up these two equations shows that the total change in
log education premium, log(!￿
LR (s)=!￿
I (s)); is simply given by the sum of the price, investment,
and quantity e⁄ects. Comparing these last two equations to their counterparts derived earlier for
the average wage (equations (17) and (18)), we note that the only change here is the appearance of
￿double di⁄erences.￿For example, the price e⁄ect here results from the di⁄erential impact of the
increase in ￿H on the human capital stocks of college and non-college workers. The same goes for
investment and quantity e⁄ects. However, inspecting these two equations also shows that the three
e⁄ects have the same signs on the college premium as they had on the average wage. This is because
college workers have higher ability on average, and therefore (i) they have a larger human capital
stock before the shock (resulting in a positive price e⁄ect), (ii) they increase their investment by
more after the shock (negative investment e⁄ect), and (iii), in the long run they experience a larger
increase in their human capital stock (positive quantity e⁄ect).
To understand the behavior of the college premium among di⁄erent age groups, two points
should be noted. First, the price and quantity e⁄ects on the college premium increase with age￿
notice the multiplicative (s ￿ 1) terms that appear in these two e⁄ects￿ whereas the investment
e⁄ect does not vary with age. Therefore, in the short run the constant investment e⁄ect dominates
the price e⁄ect for younger individuals, but not for older ones who experience a larger price e⁄ect
(s ￿s). The formal proof in the appendix establishes that s > 1; so that the college premium does
fall among a group of young individuals in the short run, but not for the old. Second, as before,
the only di⁄erence of long run is the additional quantity e⁄ect. As a result, some of the relatively
younger individuals (s< s <s) also experience a rise in the premium, and only the very young see
a decline in the long run.
3.3 Within-Group Wage Inequality
A well-known empirical fact, ￿rst documented by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993, ￿gure 3), is that
the wage growth in a given percentile of the wage distribution during SBTC has been monotonically
related to the ranking of that percentile before SBTC. In particular, wages in the higher percentiles
in 1963 also experienced high growth from 1963 to 1989, while the opposite happened at lower
percentiles. Consequently, the rise in wage inequality happened by the stretching out of the entire
wage distribution. The following proposition states that the same outcome happens in the present
model.
Proposition 4 (Within-Group Inequality) Let wI (￿) be the average wage at the ￿th percentile
20To the extent that the change in the college premium is large in response to SBTC, these approximations would
not be accurate for quantitative purposes. However, they are useful for explaining the intuition of the results, and
we employ them here for that purpose. They are not however used in any proof or derivation.
24of the wage distribution before SBTC and wLR (￿) be the average wage at the ￿th percentile of the
wage distribution in the new steady state after SBTC. Then, wLR (￿)=wI (￿) is increasing in ￿:
Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993, ￿gure 5) also show that the same fanning out of the wage
distribution is obtained when one conditions on a given age group. This is also true in the present
model. The intuition is simple and can already be seen from ￿gure 1, which shows that a higher
price of human capital stretches out the wage distribution at every age (above a threshold) with-
out a change in the relative ranking of individuals. Therefore, individuals who earn high wages
before SBTC also experience a larger increase in their wages after SBTC (except for very young
individuals). The next corollary states this result, and the proof follows.
Corollary 4 Let wI (￿js) and wLR (￿js) be the average wage at the ￿th percentile of the wage
distribution conditional on age before SBTC and in the new steady state after SBTC, respectively.
Then, wLR (￿js)=wI (￿js) is increasing in ￿ when s > s:
3.4 Overall Wage Inequality
As mentioned earlier, the movement of overall inequality and between-group inequality in opposite
directions in the 1970s has received much attention in the literature. In this section we analyze the
behavior of overall wage inequality in response to SBTC both in the short run and in the long run.
We show that under a simple su¢ cient condition, overall inequality rises in the short run. Together
with the fact that the college premium falls in the short run under condition 1, this shows that the
present model is consistent with the joint behavior of college premium and overall wage inequality.
To this end, ￿rst, the cross-sectional variance of wages can be shown to be
V ar(w) =
￿






where the coe¢ cients ni￿ s are all positive in the rest of the text (the exact expressions are provided
in Appendix A). In order to eliminate the e⁄ect of the levels of variables on measures of inequality,















This expression shows that wage inequality is driven by two sources. First, heterogeneity in
learning ability (captured by V ar(A)) creates wage di⁄erences within every age group, and there-
fore increases wage inequality. Second, a higher average learning ability (E [A]) generates more
25wage growth over the life cycle￿ and hence wage di⁄erences across age groups￿ thereby increas-
ing the variance in the numerator; but it also increases the average wage, thereby increasing the
denominator. Consequently, the e⁄ect of average ability on inequality is ambiguous, whereas the
e⁄ect of ability heterogeneity on inequality is always positive.
The expression in (24) shows that the coe¢ cient of variation is increasing in ￿H; implying that,
compared to the initial steady state, wage inequality will be higher in the new steady state after
SBTC. In fact, this result could be anticipated from ￿gure 1, which shows both the widening of the
wage distribution within age groups, and the steepening of pro￿les across age groups when ￿H is
higher.
Finally, it is also possible to derive a (complicated) expression for the coe¢ cient of variation of
wages immediately after SBTC (i.e., in the short run) and prove the following result:
Proposition 5 (Rise in Overall Wage Inequality) In response to SBTC, for all ￿0
H > ￿H;
wage inequality (as measured by the coe¢ cient of variation):
1. increases in the long run, i.e., CVLR(w) > CVI(w);
2. also increases in the short run, i.e., CVSR(w) > CVI(w); if ￿ = 1:
The proof is in Appendix A. While ￿ = 1 is su¢ cient for an increase in wage inequality in the
short run, it is far from being necessary. When ￿ < 1; there is still a wide range of parameters
resulting in an increase in wage inequality in the short run, though we have not been able to ￿nd
a simple su¢ cient condition in that case.
When taken together, propositions 2 and 5 show that overall wage inequality and between-
group inequality (college premium) move in opposite directions in the short run after SBTC. As
noted earlier, this result is consistent with evidence from the U.S. data, and the present framework
delivers this outcome despite being a one-skill model.21
21An important reason for the rise in overall inequality￿ despite a falling college premium￿ is that in the short
run, average wage pro￿les shift downward and become steeper, increasing the wage di⁄erences between the young and












Notice that Q(s ￿ 1) is the stock of human capital of s-year-old individuals and is thus relatively ￿xed in the short
run. As mentioned earlier, the price e⁄ect is larger for older individuals who have a higher human capital stock
compared to younger individuals. This di⁄erential price e⁄ect steepens the wage pro￿les immediately after SBTC.
Second, the investment e⁄ect, C(Q
0
); is independent of age, so it reduces the level of wages for all age groups by the
same amount, which shifts the experience pro￿le of wages downward, and therefore, increases percentage di⁄erences
between the young and the old. In turn, this further increases inequality (as measured by the coe¢ cient of variation)
across di⁄erent age groups. As a result, overall wage inequality will increase￿ despite a fall in college premium￿
because of a steepening age pro￿le of wages. The steepening of wage pro￿les after SBTC is consistent with the U.S.
data: Katz and Murphy (1992, Table 1) report that the wages of workers with 1￿ 5 years of experience fell by 10.2
percent compared to workers with 26￿ 35 years of experience between 1971 and 1987.
263.4.1 Wage Inequality and Consumption Inequality
The measures of wage inequality discussed so far (i.e., overall, between-group and within-group)
relate to the distribution of wages at a point in time. In that sense, they provide some ￿snapshot￿
measures of inequality. For many purposes, however, it is of interest to know whether the observed
changes in these snapshots imply a parallel change in lifetime income inequality.
A somewhat surprising relevant empirical ￿nding is that the rise in consumption inequality has
been muted compared to the rise in wage inequality during this period. Although there remains
some disagreement about the exact magnitude of the rise in consumption inequality (mainly due to
data problems), several authors report ￿ndings broadly supporting this conclusion (see, for example,
Krueger and Perri (2006) and Attanasio, Battistin, and Ichimura (2004)). Moreover, the change
between the 90th and 50th percentiles of the consumption distribution has not tracked the large
rise in the 90-50 percentile wage di⁄erences. Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2004) document this fact
and ￿nd it puzzling.
We now examine the behavior of lifetime wage income inequality in response to SBTC. Note
that under the assumptions made so far, individuals choose a constant consumption path over their
life cycle. As a result, consumption inequality equals lifetime wage inequality and we use the two
interchangeably. First it can be shown (see Appendix A) that the variance of consumption equals
V ar(c) = n3V ar(A)￿
2=(1￿￿)
h : (25)
This expression di⁄ers from the one for the variance of wages (equation (23)) in two ways.
First, as noted earlier, part of the variance of wages is due to the di⁄erences in wages across age
groups (when (E (A) > 0)). This e⁄ect is not present in the variance of consumption, because
individuals with the same ability will consume the same amount regardless of their age, since they
have the same lifetime income. Therefore, the variance of consumption is driven by heterogeneity
in learning ability, which is the only source of permanent di⁄erences in lifetime incomes. Second,
a given heterogeneity in learning ability (var(A)) results in smaller consumption inequality than
wage inequality (i.e., n3 < n1; which can be shown easily). The intuition for this result is that those
individuals who have high wages later in life are exactly those who make larger investments and
accept lower wages early on. Therefore, consumption inequality is always lower than cross-sectional
wage inequality in steady state.
We now use these results to examine how wage and consumption inequality change relative to
each other in response to SBTC. In particular, when the subjective time discount rate is zero, we
can show that CV (w)2 will always increase more than CV (c)2 in response to SBTC, regardless of
other parameter values. The next proposition states this result.
27Proposition 6 (Rise in Wage and Consumption Inequality) Assume that ￿ = 1. In re-
sponse to SBTC, for all ￿0
H > ￿H; wage inequality rises more than consumption inequality in the
long run, i.e., CVLR(w)2 ￿ CVI(w)2 > CVLR (c)
2 ￿ CVI(c)2:
To prove this proposition, note that when ￿ = 1; we have c = w (using equations (12), and
(13)). Then combining equations (12), (23) and (25), we have
CV (w)2 ￿ CV (c)2 =
n2
￿










in a given steady state. It is easy to see that this expression is increasing in ￿H. Therefore, it is
higher in steady state after SBTC than in the initial steady state, which completes the proof.
Note that the di⁄erence between wage and consumption inequality increases more with an
increase in ￿H when var(A) is larger. Furthermore, if SBTC is modeled as involving a simultaneous
fall in ￿L; then the di⁄erence between wage and consumption inequality would increase even further
after SBTC. Although we have not been able to extend this result to the more general case with
￿ < 1, in the quantitative analysis (Guvenen and Kuruscu (2006)) we have found wage inequality
to increase (substantially) more than consumption inequality for a wide range of parameter values.
4 Extensions and Discussion
4.1 College Enrollment versus On-the-Job Training
Although the main focus of the present paper is on the evolution of the wage distribution, the
model also makes predictions about the behavior of college enrollment, and in particular, implies
that it will increase in response to SBTC. To show this, we ￿rst de￿ne an individual to be currently
enrolled in college if his investment time exceeds a threshold level i￿ (consistent with the standard
interpretation of the Ben-Porath model). Now, let ￿m for m = I;SR; and LR denote the fraction of
population enrolled in college in the initial steady state, the short run and the long run respectively.
We have the following result (proof in the appendix).
Proposition 7 (College Enrollment) ￿SR > ￿LR > ￿I for all s. Therefore, in response to
SBTC the fraction of population enrolled in college increases in the long-run, but increases even
more in the short-run.
The reason enrollment is highest in the short run follows from the fact that the opportunity
cost of investing￿ which is determined by current potential earnings￿ does not change immediately
28after SBTC while the potential future bene￿ts (determined by ￿0
H) increases. Over time, as the
price of human capital rises, investment becomes more costly and college enrollment falls to its ￿nal
steady state level which is still higher than the initial level.
While college enrollment overall increased in the United States from 1970 to 2000, consistent
with the proposition￿ s prediction for the long-run behavior, the enrollment rate was stagnant in
the 1970￿ s which is at odds with the model￿ s prediction for the short run (cf., Card and Lemieux
(2001)). The latter, counterfactual, implication follows from our assumption that SBTC happens
in a completely disembodied fashion: that is, the productivity of all human capital rises at the same
rate regardless of when it is acquired. As a result, the incentive to invest is strongest immediately
after SBTC begins, and strongest among young individuals which takes the form of increased college
enrollment.
Although the assumption of disembodied SBTC proved to be analytically very convenient,
in reality some types of technical change are embodied in new types of human capital. With
embodied SBTC however, it is easy to show that college enrollment does not necessarily rise, and
in fact may fall, in the short run. At the same time on-the-job investment still rises, which causes
the college premium to fall in the short run (and rise in the long run) as in the baseline case
analyzed earlier. Therefore, it seems that if part of SBTC takes place in an embodied fashion,
the counterfactual implications about college enrollment could be overturned while keeping the
plausible implications of the model for the evolution of the wage distribution. The drawback of
such a model￿ with embodied SBTC￿ is that it is not nearly as analytically tractable as our baseline
framework. Therefore, below we provide an intuitive derivation of the results just described and
relegate the details of the model and proofs to Appendix B. A full investigation of this model is
left for future work. We now turn to this variation of the model.
4.1.1 Embodied Skill-Biased Technical Change (ESBTC)
Consider a modi￿cation to the baseline model where technical change is embodied. Speci￿cally,
each period a new vintage of human capital becomes available, whose productivity is (1+￿) times
higher than the preceding vintage. At the same time, the arrival of these more productive vintages
makes all existing vintages of human capital partially obsolete, and their productivity falls by
(1￿a￿) each period after their arrival, where a > 0 controls the rate of obsolescence. For example,
the productivity of vintage-t￿ human capital at time t￿ +5 will be ￿H(1+￿)(1￿a￿)4, whereas the
productivity of a newer one, say vintage-(t￿ +2); will be ￿H(1+￿)3(1￿a￿)2 in the same period.22
22More generally, at time t+k the value of vintage-t human capital (t ￿ t




29Figure 3: College Enrollment and On-the-Job Training in the Short Run: ￿Disembodied￿versus
￿Embodied￿SBTC
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Investment decision before t￿ can be obtained by setting ￿ ￿ 0:23 Note that at time t￿ individuals
realize that investment later in life has become more attractive because more productive vintages
of human capital will become available by that time (captured by (1 + ￿)t+1￿t￿
). At the same
time, human capital becomes obsolete more quickly, reducing the marginal bene￿t from investing:
@MB￿
2=@￿ < 0. But crucially, this obsolescence reduces the marginal bene￿t more for younger
individuals who have a longer horizon than for older individuals: @2MB￿
2=@￿@s > 0: Therefore, the
e⁄ect of ESBTC is to spread investment more evenly over the life-cycle. In fact, depending on the
parameter values, investment at young ages can fall below, while investment at older ages exceed,
their levels before t￿. An example of this is shown in the right panel of ￿gure 3, which plots the
optimal investment of individuals at di⁄erent ages (for a given ability level). For the parameter
23It is clear from this optimality condition that because future productivity improvements will come embodied in
future vintages of human capital, they do not increase current incentives to invest￿ only the productivity of the
current vintage, ￿H(1+￿)
t+1￿t￿
; enters the optimality condition. (Contrast this with optimality condition (5) in the
baseline model where future rises in productivity do increase current investment.)
30choices in this example, in the ￿rst steady state individuals up to age 26 would choose to enroll
in college (dashed line). Immediately after the start of ESBTC (at time t￿) the cross-sectional
pro￿le of investment ￿attens: young individuals reduce their investment￿ those who are 24 to 26
years-old decide not to attend college anymore￿ whereas older individuals increase their on-the-job
training (line with circles).24 In contrast, the left panel plots the results from the baseline model
where both college enrollment and on-the-job investment increases in the short-run for the reasons
discussed earlier.
Although the main mechanism discussed above holds for any S, the algebra becomes tedious very
quickly as the time horizon expands. Therefore, we prove the main result in Appendix B for S = 3,
which is the shortest life span necessary to establish our results. Speci￿cally, we show that (under
some parameter conditions) ESBTC reduces college enrollment in the short-run, while increasing
investment later in life (i.e., on-the-job investment). Because on-the-job training increases, the
behavior of the college premium and average wages in response to ESBTC is qualitatively the same
as in the baseline model: that is, they fall in the short-run but rise in the long run. Appendix B
contains the formal statements and proofs of these results. Therefore, we conclude that the short-
run response of college enrollment to SBTC is sensitive to whether technical change is embodied or
disembodied, whereas the implications about the evolution of the wage distribution as well as the
implications for long-run behavior seem quite robust to that distinction.
4.2 Bringing the Model to the Data
To isolate and highlight the central mechanisms discussed in this paper, the present model abstracts
from several important features and makes some stark assumptions, such as assuming a perpetual
youth demographic structure, assuming perfect foresight about future skill prices after the arrival of
SBTC, assuming perfect substitutability in the production function, assuming that SBTC happens
as a one-time jump in the level of human capital price, among others. As a result, the present
model is too stylized to be taken directly to the data. In a companion paper (Guvenen and
Kuruscu (2006)), we relax these assumptions and provide a detailed quantitative assessment of the
model￿ s ability to explain the evolution of the U.S. wage distribution since the 1970￿ s.
An important ￿nding from that paper is that even with few modi￿cations the baseline model
proposed in this paper is quite successful in quantitatively explaining the evolution of the U.S. wage
distribution.25 Basically the model generates a fall in the college premium throughout the 70￿ s and
a strong recovery thereafter; stagnation in median wages that last for several decades; a rise in
24Of course, as time passes MB
￿
2 remains constant whereas MB
￿
1continues to rise, which implies higher investment
at all ages compared to the pre-shock levels. As a result, the investment of all individuals rise in the long run.
25Essentially the simplest model we consider in that paper relaxes the perpetual youth assumption made here and
assumes SBTC takes place over several decades rather than as a one-time jump, but keeps the remaining structure
of the baseline model in this paper intact.
31within-group inequality that matches closely the empirical counterpart; as well as a very small rise
in consumption inequality despite a large rise in wage inequality.
As an extension, we also relax the perfect foresight assumption made here and allow individuals
to learn about SBTC in a Bayesian fashion (and again solve the model numerically). Under some
plausible scenarios, this extension does not overturn the conclusions of the present paper, but new
and interesting channels emerge from the interaction of learning and human capital accumulation.
For example, the uncertainty brought about by Bayesian learning does not dampen investment
incentives. We show in that paper exactly why this is the case. As a result, this extension in fact
strengthens some of the results obtained here (such as the decline in the college premium in the
short-run). In some cases, even if individuals initially underestimate (signi￿cantly) the rise in the
average growth rate of skill prices due to SBTC, the college premium continues to fall signi￿cantly
in the short run. Finally we also show that allowing for imperfect substitution in production does
not change any substantive conclusions reached without it. Overall, that analysis suggests that
the mechanisms and channels that we study theoretically in this paper also play a quantitatively
important role for understanding the e⁄ects of SBTC and the transformation that the U.S. economy
has gone through since the 1970￿ s.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the implications of a tractable overlapping-generations model of
human capital accumulation for several trends about the evolution of the wage distribution since
the early 1970￿ s. The key element in the model is the interaction between skill-biased technical
change￿ which is interpreted broadly as a rise in the price of human capital￿ and heterogeneity
in the ability to accumulate human capital. Because of the latter heterogeneity, the response of
di⁄erent individuals to SBTC is systematically di⁄erent from each other. As a result, the model
generates rich behavior in the relative wages of individuals depending on their age and ability,
thereby creating interesting dynamics in the evolution of the wage distribution. The model is
consistent with some prominent trends observed in the U.S. data, such as the joint behavior of
the college premium (which fell ￿rst and then rose strongly) and overall inequality (which rose
throughout this period) despite the fact that the model has one type of skill; the rise in within-
group inequality; the stagnation of average wages for an extended period of time; and the small
increase in lifetime (consumption) inequality despite the large rise in wage inequality. The baseline
model implies that college enrollment should increase in the short run after SBTC which is at odds
with the U.S. experience in the 1970￿ s (at least for males). We discuss an extension with embodied
SBTC which is consistent with a falling or stagnating college enrollment in the short run while
keeping the main implications of the baseline model about the wage distribution intact.
32An area for future research is to study whether the mechanism proposed in this paper can
also help understand the di⁄erent experiences of several developed economies during this period
(cf., Katz and Autor 1999). To study this question, the current model can be extended to allow
for di⁄erences in labor market institutions￿ such as in the progressivity of income taxes￿ across
countries and over time. Notice that progressivity makes the wage structure more compressed (as
does unionization, which could also be thought of as another variation across countries and over
time), which in turn will hamper the incentives to accumulate human capital. For example, an
economy which responds to SBTC by compressing the wage structure will not experience a large
increase in inequality, but will also not be able to accumulate the requisite human capital, and
therefore experience the growth surge that happens several decades after the onset of SBTC. In
future work, we intend to explore the predictions of such a model systematically, and apply them
to understand cross-country di⁄erences in inequality trends.
33A Appendix: Derivations and Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
Substituting the optimal investment level leads to the following expressions for the average wage before
the shock and in the short run.





















































































￿H above 1. Therefore, if f0(1) < 0,






(1 ￿ ￿￿)(1 ￿ ￿)
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Corollary 2: Calculating the Transition time for Average Wages
1. How long does it take for the average wage to complete half of the transition ((wLR ￿ wSR)=2)?
Average wage t periods after the shock is given by




















De￿ne the half-life of the transition to be the smallest integer, t1, that satis￿es














where we substituted the de￿nitions of wLR and wSR from equations (15) and (16) to obtain the second
equality. The left-hand side of this last expression is























34which can be solved for the minimum integer t1: It is easy to see that the transition time t1 is decreasing
in ￿. So, the speed of convergence is higher when ￿ is smaller.
2. How long does it take for the average wage to reach its initial steady state level?
Normalize the period of shock to zero: t￿ = 0: Then for all t > 0 we have
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:
Under condition 1, the average wage falls immediately after the shock: w1 ￿ wI < 0. Then the expression
above is going to increase monotonically and cross zero after some point. There exists a t2 such that
























(1 ￿ ￿): (29)















Substitute Qc = ￿Qn and C(Qn) =
￿￿￿














































n > ￿HQn, if the function g(x) =
￿Ll+￿x






g0(x) is positive i⁄ ￿ > 1. Then !￿
LR > !￿
I i⁄ Ec (A) > En (A):




















































If xSR < xI, then !￿
SR < !￿
I. Therefore we will characterize the condition under which xSR < xI.
























This is the same condition as in proposition 1, therefore !￿
SR < !￿
I for all ￿
0




Proof of Proposition 3










































where xSR = ￿
0






n: Let xI = ￿HQn(s ￿ 1) ￿
￿￿￿
1￿￿￿￿HQn:
The education premium declines in the short run i⁄ xSR < xI.






































s(1) < 0 () s < 1 +
￿￿￿




I(s) if s < 1 +
￿￿￿
(1￿￿￿)(1￿￿):






























n > ￿HQn and ￿ > 1, the college premium would increase in the long run if s ￿ 1 ￿
￿￿￿
1￿￿￿ > 0:￿
36Derivation of the Variances of Wages and Consumption
The wage of an s-year-old individual of type j who is wj;s = ￿Ll + ￿HQj(s ￿ 1) ￿ Cj(Qj): We rewrite it
as wj;s = mj + pj(s ￿ 1), where mj = ￿Ll ￿ Cj(Qj) and pj = ￿HQj:















[mj + pj(s ￿ 1)]:
With some algebra we get
w = m +
￿
1 ￿ ￿
p = ￿Ll ￿ C(Q) +
￿
1 ￿ ￿










m = ￿Ll ￿
Z
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and ￿ p = ￿H
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The consumption of type j individual is cj = mj +
￿￿
1￿￿￿pj: Then the average consumption is
c = m +
￿￿
1 ￿ ￿￿
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Proof of Proposition 4
Remember that ws;j = ￿Ll + ￿HQj(s ￿ 1) ￿ C(Qj): Plugging in the optimal investment, we can write
ws;j = ￿Ll + n5￿
1=(1￿￿)











A. It is clear that ws;j is
increasing in y. Hence, one￿ s relative position ￿ in the wage distribution is positively related to y.
The wage of an agent with y before the shock is given by wI(y) = ￿Ll +n5￿
1=(1￿￿)
H y: The corresponding
wage in the long run is wLR(y) = ￿Ll+n5￿
01=(1￿￿)
H y: It is then easy to show that wLR(y)=wI(y) is increasing
in y:￿



































where w and w0 are the average wages in the old and new steady. Plugging in

































































An alternative way is to look at the derivative of CV (w)2￿
￿
￿H with respect to ￿H: It is easy to see that
in fact CV (w)2￿ ￿
￿H increases with ￿H:
b. Short run: Remember that the wage in the short run is
wSR











Notice that the di⁄erence between wj;s and wSR
j;s is that we have replaced mj and pj with m0
j and p0
j.
Hence the average wage in the short run is wSR = m0 + ￿
1￿￿p0 and the variance of wages in the short
run is
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where x = ￿
0
H=￿H. Similarly the average wage in the short run can be written as










We look at what happens to CV 2
SR(w) if x is increased marginally above one, or equivalently ￿
0
H is















SR(w) > 0 then we conclude that inequality increases in the short run with an increase in price of
human capital. Since wage is positive, d
dxCV 2
SR(w) would be positive if wSR
2
d
dxV arSR(w)￿V arSR(w) d
dxwSR >
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+ (1 ￿ ￿2 + ￿2￿)
￿￿
2









x=1 > 0 when
￿ = 1:￿
Proof of Proposition 7:
Let A￿
I(s) denote the ability threshold in the initial steady state above which all individuals enroll in
40college (that is, ij (s) ￿ i￿ for Aj > A￿









￿1=i￿ ￿ ￿2(s ￿ 1)
￿
where ￿0; ￿1 and ￿2 are positive constants. As could be expected, the threshold is increasing with s implying
that college enrollment falls with age. Replacing ￿H in this expression with ￿
0
H yields the threshold in the
long-run after SBTC, which is denoted by A￿
LR(s). Since ￿
0
H > ￿H it follows that A￿
LR(s) < A￿
I(s): Similarly,






























for m = I;SR and LR:
Then, the fact that A￿
SR(s) < A￿
LR(s) < A￿
I(s) implies ￿SR > ￿LR > ￿I:￿
B Appendix: A Model with Embodied SBTC
An embodied SBTC is de￿ned as a one-time jump at time t￿ in ￿ from 0 to ￿￿: Notice that if ESBTC
continues forever all individuals will be college graduates in the long run. Although this does not a⁄ect
any of our conclusions, it may seem like an extreme outcome. Alternatively, we can assume that ESBTC
continues for T (> S) years after which time ￿ reverts back to zero. For a given choice of parameters, we
can choose T such that the new steady state features an enrollment rate less than 1.
Let im (s) denote the average investment time of individuals of age s in state m (short-run, long-run,
etc.) More generally, at time t + k the value of a vintage of skill acquired at time t ￿ t￿ is given by
￿H(1 + ￿)t+1￿t
￿
(1 ￿ a￿)k￿1. Let Q￿ denote vintage-￿ human capital. The following table shows the timing
of investment and the stream of wages that result from that investment.
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We ￿rst state a condition on the parameters of the model, and then present the main result of this
section.
Condition 2 ￿(1 + ￿ ￿ ￿a(1 + ￿)) < 0:
Proposition 8 In response to embodied SBTC, in the short run, the average investment time of
1. old individuals increases, i.e., iSR (2) > iI (2);
2. young individuals falls, i.e., iSR (1) < iI (1), if condition 2 holds.
Proof. The marginal bene￿t of investment for old individuals is ￿￿H before ESBTC and ￿￿H(1 + ￿)
at time t￿. Hence, investment of all old individuals increases in the short-run since the marginal bene￿t of
41investment is larger. Note that potential earnings does not change, hence investment time also increases.
Similarly, the marginal bene￿t of investment for young individuals is given by ￿￿H(1 + ￿) before ESBTC
and by ￿￿H(1 + ￿)(1 + ￿ (1 ￿ a￿)) at time t￿. Hence, investment of young agents fall in the short-run if
￿￿H(1 + ￿)(1 + ￿ (1 ￿ a￿)) < ￿￿H(1 + ￿) which is equivalent to condition 2.￿
This result formalizes the intuition discussed above that an embodied technical change ￿attens the life-
cycle pro￿le of human capital investment: that is, individuals invest less early in life￿ therefore college
enrollment falls￿ and more later in life￿ on-the-job training rises.26
Next we turn our attention to what happens to college premium and average wages. We need the
following condition to characterize the behavior of college premium.
Condition 3 [(1 + ￿)(1 + ￿ (1 ￿ a￿))]
1=(1￿￿) + [1 + ￿]
1=(1￿￿) > [1 + ￿]
1=(1￿￿) + 1:
Proposition 9 In response to ESBTC, the college premium
1. rises in the long-run, i.e., !￿
LR > !￿
I;
2. falls in the short run, i.e., !￿
SR < !￿
I if conditions 2 and 3 hold.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that, the college premium falls if average wage falls. Since the
stock of human capital and its price do not change in the short-run the average wage would fall if on-the-job
training increases in the short-run. Since investment early in life (college enrollment) falls in the short-run
under condition 2, on-the-job training would be larger if total cost of human capital investment is larger
which would occur under condition 3.￿
Because on-the-job training increases in the short run, the behavior of the college premium in response
to ESBTC is qualitatively the same as in the baseline model.27 We want to note that the intersection of
condition 2 and 3 is not an empty set. Looking at these conditions, one can see that condition 2 holds if
depreciation parameter a is larger. The opposite is true for condition 3. Hence, both conditions hold for
intermediate values of a:
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